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Fiscal Austerity and Rental Housing Policy in the US and UK: 2010-2016 
 
Objective: The purpose of this paper is to compare the dynamics and initial impacts of 
austerity in the US and the UK (notably England) on affordable rental housing programs and 
housing support for low income tenants. The focus is upon budget retrenchment decisions 
made in the US and the UK from 2010 to 2016. The manner in which these cuts occurred, 
their volatility, and their effects are what drives this analysis. We seek to learn whether 
there have been fiscally comparable adjustments and volatility in budget decisions in the 
quite different contexts of the two countries and if so whether this can help us better 
understand the drivers and effects of change.   
We examine how the US and UK elected to impose and then partially withdraw fiscal 
retrenchment - or austerity - upon specific housing programs. Understanding the politics and 
policy choices within the framework of “austerity” or budget retrenchment helps identify 
the differences, weaknesses and potential for remaining rental housing programs.  
Our focus is upon rental housing supports partly because of their complexity and cost, 
leaving to others an assessment of other forms of housing assistance, such as in 
homeownership (Conley and Gifford, 2006; Blanchflower & Oswald, 2013). Rental housing 
assistance is also crucial in any analysis of the effectiveness and equity of welfare state 
supports for the poor because of the role rental housing costs play in the daily lives and 
budgets of most lower-income residents in both counties (Edin & Schaefer, 2015; Desmond, 
2016; Stephens and Whitehead, 2014). We make use of official budget reports, evaluations 
of the effects of budget cut-backs, interviews, and the strategic comparison of the two 
countries to help appreciate the influence of austerity-based reductions upon affordable 
rental programs.  
The overall purpose is to learn from each other’s experience by comparing the nature of this 
retrenchment and the reasons why housing for low income households was targeted; the 
similarities and differences in how it was implemented; and its initial impacts on households 
affected.    
Background Research   
This analysis takes as its starting point the Great Recession of 2008 which was the most 
severe economic dislocation to affect countries since the Depression of the 1930s (Grusky, 
Western, & Wimer, 2011; Eichengreen, 2015). The sudden, sharp declines in revenues 
emanating from the 2008 Recession added momentum in the two countries for reduced 
budget support for rental housing (McKee, Karanikolos, Belcher, & Stucker, 2012; Newman, 
2012; Mann & Ornstein, 2012; Magalhaes, 2014; Eichengreen, 2015; Tunstall, 2016; Hills et 
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al, 2016). Politically and procedurally analogous budget decisions were initially made in the 
US and the UK that suggested that the two countries could experience similar trajectories 
towards budget balance - if the budget reductions were severe, focused, and persistent 
enough.  It turns out that in both countries they were not. 
Some analysts have viewed such government funding reductions in welfare and investment 
programs as illustrations of neo-liberal policies in which nation states facing high levels of 
deficits and debt impose short or longer-term budget reductions rather than seeking 
alternatives (Crotty, 2011; Callinicos, 2012). In this model, it is argued that a condition of 
permanent or institutionalized austerity will exist in advanced democracies which face rising 
rental housing needs and chronically inadequate resources (Schafer and Streeck, 2013; 
Brooks & Manza, 2007; Pierson, 2002; Blyth, 2013; Piketty, 2013, p. 540).  Because of the 
very significant costs of housing assistance, its funding appears an unavoidable target of 
such austerity politics.  
In practice the process of reducing budgets since the Great Recession has not been linear 
nor fully predictable, given the unevenness of budget shortfalls, surpluses, and the political 
choices made by each government. Examining fiscal variability offers insights into what fiscal 
choices are mutable, which are comparatively divergent, and which appear to create the 
largest negative impacts upon assisted rental housing. i 
 
To appreciate the vulnerability and variability in government supports for rental housing - 
and the differences between rhetoric and actuality, it is useful to recall that the most recent 
episode of budget reductions has not been the only one of its kind (Center for Budget and 
Policy Priorities 2007; Schwartz, 2014; Housing Europe, 2015). Earlier cutbacks were 
generated by both then-President Reagan and UK Prime Minster Thatcher (Palmer & Sawhill, 
1984; Pierson, 1994; Goetz, 1995; Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 1998; Orlebeke, 2000; Korpi 
& Palme, 2003; ii and in the UKiii (Gibb and Whitehead, 2007; Stephens & Whitehead, 2014; 
Bochel & Powell, 2016; Prasad, 2012).  In the US, Reagan era cutbacks significantly reduced 
the authorized level of funding for housing programs, although the funds actually obligated 
in multi-year contracts did not drop as sharply (Palmer & Sawhill, 1984; Sinclair, 1985; 
Schwartz, 2014).  Subsequent attempts in the US to close the federal housing agency in the 
1990s led to budget retrenchment and pressures to privatize housing programs (Whitehead, 
1993; Goetz, 1995).  
 
In the UK there is also evidence of continuity in the shift from entitlement towards 
conditional funding and individual responsibility since the 1970s (Edmiston, 2017; Wright, 
2016).  Even so, the Conservative government expanded support for social housing 
investment in the 1990s while the Labour Government which succeeded Thatcher, while 
further restricting income related housing benefits developed policies aimed at significantly 
reducing child housing poverty and to improving the physical condition of the public and 
social rental stock (Waldfogel, 2010; Ridge, 2013; Lupton, Burchardt, Hills & Vizard, 2016).   
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In making this comparison, analysts have pointed out for decades that the US has 
contributed notably less over the last half century to the reduction in poverty than the UK 
(Skocpol & Ikenberry, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Smeeding, 2006.  Smeeding (2006: 82), 
for example, notes that the US “devotes by far the smallest share of its resources to 
antipoverty income transfer programs … In 2000, the United States spent less than 3 
percent of GDP on cash and near-cash assistance for the nonelderly (families with children 
and the disabled). This amount is less than half the share of GDP spent for this purpose by 
Canada, Ireland or the United Kingdom…”  
 
To conduct a sensible analysis of current budget reductions of housing programs therefore 
mandates an appreciation of the differing levels and patterns of welfare and housing 
support traditionally offered in the UK and US. Compared with the United States, for 
example, much larger proportions of the population of the UK benefit from forms of welfare 
and housing assistance than in the US (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Schwartz, 2014; Hills, 2014).  
The UK has had more ample funding for housing programs with significant growth in the 
early 1990s under a conservative administration and again after 2008 under Labour.  As a 
result of this higher level of financial support, in England over 17% of households live in 
some form of social housing receiving subsidies through below market rents. In addition 
over 60% of all social tenants and 26% plus of private tenants receive income related 
housing assistance (called “Housing Benefit”) which is available to all eligible tenant 
households. iv Thus in 2014/15 over five million (22.5%) households in England received help 
through income related or rental support - or both.  
In the US by contrast only roughly 4% of the total population, 12% of all renters, and 24% of 
all income eligible households, receive some form of housing allowance from federal, state 
or local government (Harvard Joint Center, 2013, p. 7; Irving & Loveless, 2015, p. 22).  By 
one estimate, the US serves roughly 5 million housing units (a similar number to England but 
with over five times the number of units). It is also estimated that this leaves an unmet need 
in the US for an additional 15 million units of rental assistance - a figure proportionately 
comparable to the numbers assisted in England (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, 
2007, table 1).  
While there may be some degree of unpredictability in the delivery of housing programs 
within the two countries over the next decade or more, the basic political-institutional 
patterns and momentum for fiscal restraint appear well-organized and embedded in both 
countries. vThere is however difficulty in assessing policy and budgetary processes that are 
officially incomplete and opaque. As legislated, budget reductions will not be concluded for 
many years, it is possible that we may miss vital analytic issues and trends.  
In the next section, we briefly identify the trajectory of budget deficits and debt levels 
including estimates into the next decade allied with decisions made in the US and UK from 
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2010 to 2016 that shaped their budget reductions.  This leads next to an assessment of the 
effects of these budget choices upon the rental housing sector in each country.  We 
conclude by briefly assessing comparative similarities and differences, possible future 
trajectories as well as gaps in our understanding of the design and implementation of 
austerity upon social housing.  
Deficits, Debt and Policy Choices affecting rental housing programs in the US and UK 
Central to the policy and political motivation for austerity politics in the US and the UK was 
the level of deficit and debt each country faced in 2010 (Mann & Ornstein, 2012; Krugman, 
2015).vi Table (1) shows US and UK on-budget deficits and total debt levels from the year 
2000 to estimates for 2026 and 2020/21 respectively in constant dollars/pounds sterling. 
These deficit and debt levels reflect the impact of the Great Recession, the use of stimulus 
funding, and then the policy decisions made to reduce the size of the deficit. (We 
synoptically describe these decisions in chart 1, below.) 
Deficits at the peak of the post financial crisis were broadly similar. Debts in the UK have 
risen more rapidly than in the US as a proportion of GDP but are projected to decline in the 
UK over the next five years while they continue to rise in the US.  
Table 1 about here 
The on-budget deficits for the US fluctuated from a deficit of $119 billion in 2000 to a deficit 
of $1.7 trillion in 2009 as the Great Recession began. The deficit rose so substantially in large 
part because in a single year, 2009, Congress allocated roughly $700 million for stimulus 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), before the initiation of 
Budget and Control Act (BCA of 2011; see more below) led to budget cuts. In that year, the 
deficit constituted over nearly 11% of GDP.    
Following the enactment of the BCA, deficit reduction measures coupled with improved tax 
revenues and lower debt costs, caused deficits to decline to $466 billion by 2015.  As a 
percent of GDP, deficits dropped to 2.6 % of GDP for a reduction of roughly 70% below the 
peak. This represented a percent of GDP that was “below the average deficit…over the past 
50 years.” (Congressional Budget Office 2015a&b; Committee for a Responsible Federal 
Budget (2015). Debt levels in the US are expected to level off and then increase steadily 
from 34% of GDP in 2000 to an estimated 86% in 2026, and then up to 141% of GDP by 2045 
(Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, (2016, p. 3).  
This is mainly due to Social Security, the major health care programs, and net interest costs 
which were projected by the US Congressional Budget Office in 2016 to rise from 11.8% of 
GDP in 2016 to 15.4% in 2026. Thus, mandatory funding in the US will become an ever larger 
share of GDP up through 2025/26, while funding for on-budget discretionary programs 
(including low-income housing) will decline from 6.5% of GDP to 5.1% or potentially lower by 
2025 (Congressional Budget Office, 2015a, p. 4-5; Timiraos, 2015; Trust Fund, 2015). vii 
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Turning to the public spending in the UK (defined as total managed expenditure - which 
includes all government spending whether national or local) reached a peak of 46% of 
national income in 2009/2010 (Institute for Fiscal Studies - IFS - , 2015 a and b), as in the US 
significantly as  a result of stimulus funding.  The Coalition and then the Conservative 
governments were expected to reduce this to below 40% by 2016 and to just over 36% (1% 
above the USA) by 2020. viii  Thereafter the assumption was that public expenditure would 
rise in line with national income (IFS, 2015b).  
As Table 1 (above) shows this pattern of expenditure generated a spike in the UK deficit by 
2009-10 reaching a high of 10.3% of GDP.  The deficit then dropped to 3.8% of GDP by 2015, 
and, at that time unlike the US, had been projected to decline further to a surplus in 2021.  
Debts in the UK however were set to increase from 65% of GDP in 2009 to 84 % of GDP in 
2015, before declining to 75% of GDP by 2021. Thus in the years after 2015, debt levels in 
the US are projected to rise into the next decade while those in the UK are notix. 
Deciding to Cut Budgets:  Reflected in the deficit and debt numbers shown above in table 
(1), are the policy and political decisions made as to how much to cut budgets, what to 
target, and for how long to impose the reductions.  
In the US, budget reductions were most recently legislatively expressed in the Budget and 
Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This Act which was not the outcome of a popular vote but rather 
emerged after Congressional and Executive Branch agents failed in negotiations to agree on 
alternatives to cutting roughly $1 trillion equally from both the domestic and military 
discretionary accounts (Mann & Ornstein, 2012; Eichengreen, 2015, p.333; Krugman, 2013; 
Kogan, 2012; Edelberg, 2013; CBO, 2013a; GAO, 2014; Steinhauer, 2016; Bochel & Powell, 
2016).  The government’s political fractures meant it was unable to find alternatives to the 
BCA’s rigid, mandatory cuts so thatx the first phase of budget sequestration cuts took effect 
in 2013.xi  For one political analyst, Congress unlocked “…mindless, across-the-board budget 
cuts in domestic and defense discretionary spending that were openly and deliberately 
designed not to occur” (Ornstein, 2013).  The mandatory reduction of the discretionary 
budget began on March 1, 2013 with reductions of roughly $110 billion set to occur each 
year until (initially) 2021 (Kogan, 2013, p. 1-2).   
Support for the BCA cuts lapsed in Congress for both the 2014 and 2015 budget cycles, and 
again with the budgets for years 2016 and 2017 (Krugman, 2015). Congress added funding in 
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, adding 
a further $80 billion over two years thus eliminating roughly 90% of sequestration’s cuts for 
non-defense discretionary programs in 2016 and roughly 60% in 2017. Without this 
agreement, $37 billion would have been cut from domestic programs in 2016, including HUD 
(Herszenhorn, 2015; Greenstein, 2015). xii The US Congressional Budget Office estimated in 
2016 that deficits would be $130 billion higher than if the full effect of the 2011 BCA had 
been allowed to occur (CBO, 2016a.)  Congress extended budget caps and potential 
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sequestrations cuts from 2021 until 2025. Thus for four of the last five fiscal years additional 
funding has been found to satisfy differing fiscal constituencies.   
The position in the UK was very different in that policy choices were explicitly expressed in 
the UK where welfare reform and deficit reduction were seen by 2010 as central to the 
Conservative party manifesto (Lister and Bennett, 2010) . In 2015, the electorate again 
chose to continue budget retrenchment by reelecting the Conservative government on a 
manifesto which included continued austerity. Both elections, the government argued, 
provided them with a mandate to make significant cutbacks in public expenditure including 
major structural reforms of the welfare system (Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Hamnett, 2010; 2013; 
Hills, 2015).  Included within these reforms were alterations to the system for supporting 
affordable rental housing 
The UK government initially planned nine years of reductions but as in the USA they soon 
slowed their imposition. By 2015 they expected to see a surplus by 2019-20 (HM Treasury, 
2015a and b; Tetlow, 2015). The UK Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2015 a & b) noted 
in July 2015 , ‘the new Government has used its first Budget to loosen significantly the 
impending squeeze on public services spending that had been penciled in by the Coalition in 
March”. The Government slowed the level of cuts and thus delayed the expected return to a 
budget surplus by a year to 2019-20 (HM Treasury, 2015b; OBR 2015a, Douglas & Winning, 
2015; Emmerson and Tetlow, 2015). However the Government also announced a number of 
additional restrictions on welfare payments as well as reductions in social sector rents 
(Bochel & Powell, 2016).  
In spring 2016, the new Conservative government once again slowed the rate of budget 
reductions so that a surplus would not be achieved until 2020 -21 (HM Treasury, 2016a; 
Keep, 2016 a & b). As a result of the Brexit decision and its potential impact on the economy 
and tax revenues, the government now under Theresa May further extended this period at 
least to the next Parliament but without a defined end date (HM Treasury, 2016b). xiii   
How were budget cuts allocated? Central to the political choices made in 2011 in the US, 
and in 2010 in the UK, was the partial or total exemption of major sources of funding and 
deficits.  In the US , mandatory or entitlement program benefits which go to everyone who 
meets eligibility requirements, such as aid to pensioners, the unemployed, the elderly or sick 
and disabled, are not subject to annual congressional/parliamentary actions were exempted 
.xiv  Thus politicians necessarily had disproportionately to reduce funds to the smaller 
discretionary programs, including housing and community development.   
Social Security, the major health care programs, and net interest are projected by the US 
Congressional Budget Office in 2016 to rise from 11.8% of GDP in 2016 to 15.4% in 2026. 
Thus, mandatory funding in the US will become an ever larger share of GDP up through 
2025/26, while funding for on-budget discretionary programs (including low-income 
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housing) will decline from 6.5% of GDP to 5.1% by 2025 (Congressional Budget Office 2015a, 
p. 4-5; Timiraos, 2015); Trust Fund, 2015). xv  
As in the US, parts of UK public spending have been protected either formally or implicitly, 
including a provision that military expenditures should be no lower than 2% of total 
expenditures and that the overseas aid budget should be protected.  Another deficit 
reduction protected provision is that the National Health Service (NHS) budget should rise in 
real terms throughout the period to 2020.  As a result health expenditures are set to 
increase as a proportion of government spending from 17% in 2010 to 19% in 2020.  
State pension benefits have also been protected by a so called “triple lock” in which 
increases must be higher than inflation or match average wage increases or 2.5% whichever 
is the highest.  It has been estimated that this will cost some £6bn a year on a budget of 
£70bn for state pensions, resulting in 21% of government spending being committed to state 
pensions by 2020. Senior British commentators argue that this puts deficit reduction at risk, 
with other budgets relatively unprotected, notably welfare related funding (Hills, 2015).  
The outcome of these exclusions was similar to the USA. While overall public expenditure 
allocated by spending departments fell by over 10%, the budgets for Communities and Local 
Government and the Department of Work and Pensions fell by 51% and 36% respectively 
(IFS, 2015a).  
During the 2015 election campaign a commitment was made to cut a further £12bn from 
the welfare budget by 2017/18 to support the austerity objective. The difficulty for the 
government was that almost half of the £220bn welfare budget was protected, so the 
cutback needed to be of the order of 10% of the remaining budget.   
The cutbacks that were actually implemented were concentrated on reducing maximum 
welfare payments per household (technically by limiting Housing Benefit), a four year freeze 
on benefit rates and on maximum rents allowable for Housing Benefit, increasing rents for 
higher income social tenants, and limiting access to housing support for younger people (HM 
Treasury 2015a).  Controlling expenditures on the large proportion of welfare spending 
arising from as-of-right benefits was to some extent achieved by changing the eligibility 
rules. So far the main shift has been through raising the retirement age quite rapidly over 
the next few years. 
The UK Office of Budget Responsibility (2015b) estimated that welfare payments would 
decline as a percent of GDP from 11.8% to 9.8% from 2014-15 to 2020-21. This decline to 
below 10% of GDP, if it occurs, would be the first time in thirty years that this has happened.  
The relative scale of these reductions is analogous to the scale of US cuts. Even so, in 
absolute value, total public sector current expenditures on all welfare costs will increase 
slightly over this time period from £214 bn to £227 bn by 2020-21 while the elements 
subject to cutbacks will decline from £119 bn to £112 bn in 2021, a reduction of roughly 5%.  
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Chart 1, below, profiles our comparison of the budget revision processes and decisions made 
in the two countries following the Recession. The chart synoptically portrays what occurred 
from 2010 to 2016, offering an abridged comparison of the central choices made. Each 
country found itself with much larger deficits and debts than expected after the Recession 
and consequent stimulus programs and was driven by these large deficits and debts to cut 
public expenditures. Each country, for apparently different reasons found itself in a position 
where much of their expenditure could not be restrained. Each government made 
apparently clear decisions covering the duration, scale of cuts, and their targets, with both 
planning for fairly lengthy reductions concentrated on a small part of the expenditure 
program which particularly hit lower income households. While each backed-off after a 
while the perceived need for additional cutbacks has remained in place.   What at the time 
of writing is less clear is whether the political will in both countries has changed shifting 
towards greater investment in infrastructure and higher debt levels while maintaining the 
downward pressure on welfare.   
Chart 1 about here 
 
Assessing Housing Outputs and Outcomes: 
The specific focus of this inquiry is on housing budgets and in this section we discuss how 
the roughly parallel choices made in the US and UK around public expenditures and debt 
impacted  public and social housing as well as income related rental housing benefits. 
Despite the scale of the deficit reductions, there has been relatively little systematic 
research attention to the effects or outcomes of the fiscal choices described above with 
somewhat more analysis conducted in the UK.  Here we make a first attempt to describe the 
effects of the “austerity” budget cuts in each country as they impacted rental housing 
programs seeking to answer the questions: what do we know about the impacts or 
outcomes of fiscal austerity upon assisted housing programs?  What do we know about the 
consequences of budget cuts for the welfare of families, seniors, and the homeless?   
A core part of the difficulty of assessing the impacts of budget reductions is that the effects 
can be hard to distinguish from other macro-economic, financial, and policy changes that 
occurred concurrently. Identifying the direct outcomes, for example, of the BCA in isolation 
or indeed welfare changes in the UK  from other pushes and pulls on the level of poverty, 
homelessness, and public housing agency performance is complicated; many factors 
influence levels of homelessness, family poverty, and poor building maintenance in public 
projects.  
 
Reducing support for US rental housing programs:  While US budget cuts were supposed to 
be applied equally and evenly across all discretionary programs, budget data released in 
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2016 reveal that the budget increases authorized in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 were 
not equally distributed among all Congressional Budget Subcommittees. While the 
Subcommittee addressing HUD’s budget received an increase of 3.6%, the committees 
setting budgets for Energy and Water were raised by 12% and Veterans Affairs increased by 
nearly 10% (Kogan & Shapiro, 2016; Reich & Rice, 2016).  (see Figure 1)xvi 
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In percentage terms the BCA resulted in inflation-adjusted reductions of 4% to appropriated 
budget authority for on-budget housing programs in 2011, another 10.5% cut in 2012, 
13.2% the next year, and cuts of 7 to 8% in the years 2014 and 2015. The roughly $19 billion 
in funding that HUD had prior to the BCA for use in issuing vouchers to families was cut by 
$938 million. This did not necessarily mean that families lost their funding for their 
apartments, but rather that local agencies administering vouchers did not issue all of the 
vouchers they had originally been told they could award to needy families. US Government 
Accountability Office research (GAO, 2014a) on the initial results of the BCA, found that 
67,000 fewer poor households were being helped by HUD in 2014 compared with 2012 (not 
counting vouchers for homeless veterans).  Funds used to help cover operating costs of 
public housing agencies were also reduced. xvii   
 
In table (2) below we outline effects of the budget cuts emerging after the BCA. These 
effects apply only to those agencies examined and do not necessarily refer to country-wide 
patterns. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Of long-term significance, a number of agencies administering HUD’s major rental assistance 
programs have withdrawn from the program. Local agencies administering HUD’s funding 
felt that they would have stop issuing vouchers and cut staffing;  half of 300 surveyed 
agencies said they had stopped issuing new vouchers and one-quarter had cut staff as a 
result of the actual or pending budget cuts.  Roughly 270 public housing agencies stated 
their intent to terminate their administration of the Section 8 or Housing Choice voucher 
program ((Harvard Joint Center, 2013, p. 36; Housing Affairs Letter, April 2014).  Between 
2010 and 2014, “120 Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) transferred their HCV programs to 
other entities” (Abt Associates, 2015, p. 7) and 139 voucher programs shut down between 
2010 and 2013. xviii  Part of their unwillingness to administer the program is the cut in the 
administrative fees paid to them by HUD. xix (Abt, 2015, p. 44).  
 
HUD’s annual funding for the capital or physical repair and improvement of the low income 
housing stock managed by public housing agencies is among the critical program supports 
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that HUD has been cutting for years. Funding for capital repairs to public housing projects 
had, for example, declined by 18% from 2008 to 2012  (Harvard Joint Center, 2013), 
reducing repairs  resulting in “deteriorating living conditions and increased utility costs for 
the 1.1 million low-income households living in public housing” (GAO, 2014, p. 117). Even 
following a modest increase funded through the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act in 
2009, HUD reported in 2013 that they already had lost 6,000 units from the livable public 
housing stock due to the “general deterioration of units due to funding in recent years being 
lower than needed to repair and maintain all units, which was deepened by the effects of 
sequestration” (GAO, 2014a, p. 78; NYCHA, 2013).  The government expects to lose 10,000 
units a year in the future due to the on-going reductions in funding for capital repairs.  
 
Congress also cut state and local government funding under the community development 
block grant program (CDBG); see figure 1 above. Such funds were used by local governments 
for decades for a diverse range of neighborhood renewal, housing and development needs. 
CDBG funds were reduced by 49% from 2000 to 2016. xx  HUD’s HOME program was also cut 
heavily, by 55%, after 2000; from 2010 to 2015 alone funding was halved from $1.8 billion to 
$900 million. xxi 
 
The imposition of minimum rents is another means some PHAs must use to address the 
reduced funding from Congress.  Such minimum rents are only allowed for a small number 
of agencies through regulatory flexibility granted by Congress in the Moving to Work (MTW) 
program. In one MTW authority, for example, minimum rents have been set at $150, while 
others have elected lower thresholds. xxii  It remains unclear whether and when minimum 
rents will become more widely adopted (Schwartz, 2016). 
 
Lastly, the funding for the development of new units for low-income elderly and disabled 
persons has been eliminated after the BCA (GAO, 2016, p. 5).  Funding for elderly housing 
(Section 202) dropped from $549 million in 2008 to $8 million in 2012 and then currently to 
zero. The executive director of Seattle’s Low Income Housing Institute commented that “The 
[202] program’s been decimated… and we have a huge increase in the number of homeless 
seniors.” Funding for new units for the disabled (Section 811) also dropped from $136 
million in 2008 to zero by 2012. The funding from these programs was apparently switched 
to a new HUD Rental Assistance Demonstration (Hoag, 2015; Housing Affairs Letter, 2016). 
xxiii 
 
There is also  on-going research in which HUD is experimenting with removing other rules 
and restrictions, imposing time limits on assistance for the first time, experimenting with 
raising rents and moving families out of projects whose physical conditions have become 
uninhabitable (Abt, 2015; Econometrica, 2016;  Khadduri & Culhane, 2015; Moving to Work 
Expansion, 2016.) xxiv  The results of this research on housing authorities and the lives of 
households will not be known for years.   
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The absence of any research causally linking  human effects to austerity is an important 
shortcoming in the US, although there remain severe rental housing need, high levels of 
homelessness, and substantial waiting lists for assisted housing which are long standing 
features of the US rental market for lower income households. It is unclear if these are 
worse now as a result of the BCA. 
 
While these reductions in Congressional funding for lower income rental assistance have 
occurred, some forms of financial support for lower income families have continued through 
off-budget tax credit programs, including the Earned Income Tax Credit, child care tax credit, 
and less directly through the low income housing tax credit (LIHTC). Funding for other lower 
income welfare support programs such as Medicaid and food stamps were exempted for 
now from BCA cuts. Most of these forms of support do not however address the needs of 
the very lowest income persons and families where the loss of HUD funding seems 
potentially most impactful (Moffitt, 2013; 2015). There has been a modest level of state and 
city substitution of funding for housing assistance in states like New York and California, 
with no systematic evidence to date on unfunded gaps. 
 
Reductions to UK Housing Assistance Programs:  Two major distinctions between the UK and 
the US experience lie in the fact first that in the UK central government has control of both 
housing and welfare policy so can implement change by a thousand cuts in particular 
programs and second, that Housing Benefit (the as-of-right income related housing allowance 
available to all types of tenants) is a significant element in the welfare budget. In the US not 
only do housing specific subsidies make up a smaller part of total welfare subsidies with other 
support in the form of off-budget tax credits, but also there are fewer ready political levers 
available to directly introduce change.   
Table 3 sets out the most important reductions in housing support that have been introduced 
in the UK since the introduction of austerity.  They come under two main headings: reductions 
in capital grants to support investment in social housing (both rented and increasingly for 
subsidized owner-occupation), and restrictions on income related housing support. 
Capital support for social housing has always been an area where cutbacks have been 
relatively easy to achieve by direct reductions, the privatization of the housing stock, and 
increases in rents offset by increases in income related benefits (Stephens & Whitehead, 
2014).  Since the financial crisis there have been three government programs to support 
investment in new social housing in England, with other UK countries having their own 
programs. From 2008 to 2011, £8.4 bn was provided to enable stalled development to get 
back underway as part of the overall stimulus package.   When the Coalition government’s 
austerity program was introduced housing suffered particular cutbacks so that from 2011 - 
2015 funding was halved to £4.5 bn. However the government expected social landlords to 
produce rather more affordable homes by increasing both debt and rents for new tenants. 
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From 2016 the same approach of less money for more homes was applied with a reduction in 
subsidy of over 60% (House of Lords, 2016). 
With respect to income related benefits the Coalition and then the Conservative government 
budget cuts addressed specific features of long existing housing supports affecting both those 
in the private rented sector (where around one in four households receive Housing Benefit), 
and the social rented sector where traditionally those with the lowest incomes pay less and 
sometimes no rent because of their eligibility for Housing Benefit (HB).  
The UK Housing Benefit program has experienced a range of different types of 
cutbacks. The minimum age for full eligibility was raised to 34, limiting 
assistance for younger tenants to rooms in a shared dwelling The local housing 
allowance (LHA) which determines the maximum rent eligible for Housing 
Benefit was lowered to cover only the bottom 30% of the local market rent 
instead of 50%; local at the same time rent maxima were introduced; and social 
tenants “with more bedrooms than they are deemed to need” (DPW 2014) were 
required to pay additional  rent for these rooms (named the bedroom tax); and 
finally  the maximum overall cap on welfare payments per household for working 
aged welfare claimants not in work was introduced at a figure roughly equal to 
the median household income for a family households and lower for single 
people.    
When the Conservative-only government came to power in May 2015, they continued the 
process of reducing the welfare cap: abolishing Housing Benefit for those under 21; and 
introduced a four year freeze on both working aged benefits and the local housing allowance 
limit.   
Most of these cutbacks were rationalized by the government as increasing the efficient use of 
scarce housing, putting downward pressure on market rents, and incentivizing work (by 
removing the cap if an individual works at least 16 hours per week). In practice they impacted 
mostly on lower income households with few choices and on those living in high-rent areas 
(Joyce, 2014; Whitehead & Sagor, 2015); for instance 45% of those capped have lived in 
London.  
Looking at the initial impacts it should be noted that unlike in the US, the British government 
elected to mitigate in the short term the immediate effects of the bedroom tax and the 
welfare cap through the introduction of new short-term “discretionary housing payments” 
(DHP) funded by the central government and allocated by local authorities. Particular groups, 
such as those in receipt of certain disability allowances, were also exempted.  Local 
government also sometimes provided similar funding, although the scale of this local 
substitution has not been fully documented. 
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The immediate effects of the welfare cap were also small, with numbers in the low thousands 
and declining. However the later changes will impact on most social tenants with three or 
more children and is thus beginning to hit mainstream working age households.  
The impact on lower income households living in the private rented sector in higher demand 
areas has been far more immediate and implies that those unable to find accommodation 
within the local housing allowance maxima will have less income than the minimum assumed 
necessary to purchase other necessities of life. Importantly the size of the private rented 
sector has doubled over the past ten years to around 19% of all households with a resulting 
rapid increase in the HB bill for private tenants to over £9bn in 2014 (House of Lord, 2016). 
Finally, only pensioners were exempted from the freeze on welfare benefits which impacts all 
working age households.  
What has to be stressed is that the cutbacks have not so far actually reduced the total of 
income support in money terms. In 2011 housing benefit accounted for around 10% of the 
welfare bill which including state pensions, at 44%, accounted for 24% of public spending. By 
2016 housing benefit accounted for 11.5% of the £211 bn welfare bill which had risen to 28.5% 
of public spending (HM Treasury, 2016b). So while there had been heavy cuts for individuals 
they had not been enough to offset underlying upward trends in either income related 
housing support or more general assistance.  However the structural changes put in place will 
have increasing impacts as will the four year freeze on benefits especially as inflation likely 
increases after Brexit.  
Evidence on the impact of changes: An important difference between the US and the UK is 
that the recent fiscal reductions in the UK have been the subject of more research than has 
been undertaken in the US partly because the objective of reframing the entire welfare state 
has been both more transparent and more sweeping. Government funded and independently 
conducted research projects have assessed the impacts that have occurred, for whom, and 
where within the country the effects may be clearest. 
Expectations about outcomes of the announced British program of welfare and housing 
reforms were initially fairly negative. Hamnett (2010), for example argued that: “The UK 
Coalition government’s proposals for welfare reform…represent perhaps the most radical 
reshaping of the British welfare system since its introduction post-1945…” Taylor-Gooby 
(2012, p: 63, 67) argued that the government’s intent was a ‘fundamental restructuring of the 
whole state sector to embed change and underpin a permanent shift to a smaller state.”.  Hills 
(2014: chap 8, p. 6) argued:” it is virtually unavoidable that austerity will hit the poor much 
harder than those with higher incomes…”  In actuality, while research in the UK has shown a 
range of  initial negative outcomes, it also shows that some of the worst fears about welfare 
reform have to date not occurred.  
The negatives: In one of the earliest studies, researchers at the London School of Economics 
reported that the British social benefits system was “becoming tougher and tighter, with more 
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sanctions, reclassifications, exclusions and suspensions of payments.”  Many social tenants in 
their survey faced higher costs and cuts to their income which resulted in “tenants 
experiencing poverty, anxiety, debt and health problems.  Food banks they said were now 
becoming essential for some families and they, as well as their landlords expected more 
evictions to occur (Power, Provan, Herden, & Serle, 2014a & b). Private tenants reported in 
2014 that they were worse off than they were two years before, and were coping by cutting 
back on food, electricity, their heat, or simply by borrowing from friends or going into debt 
(Beatty, Cole, Foden, & Kemp, 2014; JRF, 2014a and b). 
Another research project used surveys of tenants affected by the bedroom tax and compared 
the effects upon them with a control sample. Two-thirds of those affected by the tax, but only 
31% of a control group, said they were finding it hard to pay their rent. They reportedly 
managed by borrowing from others but even with that help over forty % (42%) said they were 
already late in paying their rents or in arrears.  The tenants said they were also more likely to 
be afraid of being evicted and having to move away from their local communities. Again, they 
found that those affected by the new policy were also cutting down on the funds they allocate 
for food and for energy costs (Ipsos MORI, 2014a).  
In research which focused on local housing associations and their tenants, early impact results 
suggested that the cuts imposed led to delays in rent payments, as tenant’s shares of rent 
rose, with a consequent increase in rent arrears losses.  In a survey of tenants roughly half 
(49%) said they were in arrears with over three-quarters (79%) stating they were having 
difficulty paying their rent.  Over a third, or 35%, of agencies in the survey reported that their 
rental income had declined with 39% reporting increases in arrears (Ipsos MORI, 2014b).  
The accounts of housing associations do not however fully bear this out. Detailed case studies 
with associations found that more efficient rent collection and more relational management 
together with the availability of discretionary housing payments meant that rent arrears in 
the social sector had not increased to a significant extent; and declined in some associations. 
Very few evictions specific to the welfare cuts had taken place fifteen months later although 
proceedings were beginning to be put in place (DWP, 2014a; NHF, 2014).   
A core area of retrenchment has been with respect to cuts to the Local Housing Allowance 
for private tenants.  The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) published two reports that 
described the initial effects of the cuts to tenants’ housing benefit (Brewer, Emmerson, Hood 
& Joyce, 2014; Joyce, 2014; Hood, 2015). The first report by IFS showed that at the date the 
law took effect for tenants that allowance support dropped noticeably.   
Many landlords did not respond to the reforms by reducing rents but rather the impact was 
experienced by tenants who lost roughly 7 pound a week or nearly $650 US a year in 
benefits (much higher in London) The burden was felt by poorer tenants, not landlords 
(Joyce, 2014). Many landlords said they would be less prepared to rent/let to households on 
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benefits - although the numbers actually doing so have increased (House of Commons, Work 
and Pensions Select Committee, 2014). 
Research for the National Housing Federation found evidence of deep concerns among 
social rental sector landlords about the future. They believed their budget situation would 
only worsen with fears that tenants will be unable to cope. They foresaw that larger families 
with children would be those most likely to suffer.  It is those fears which would be most 
probably comparable to housing authority executives in the US; the absence of hope for 
better funding for the foreseeable future. However a further round of research found that 
these fears had not yet been realized for at least most tenants (NHF, 2014a and b & 2015). 
The most important area where there is evidence of increasing stress is in the context of 
homelessness and “rooflessness”.  In 2015 Government statistics showed that 3,369 people 
slept rough on any one night across England - this is over double the numbers counted in 
2010.  The figures are said to be very much higher in 2016 (McVeigh,2016). In terms of 
statutory homeless, the figures in England show that almost 115,000 applied to their local 
authority for homelessness assistance in 2015/16, a 12 per cent rise since 2010/11. The 
numbers accepted rose from around 44,000 in 2010/11 to nearly 58,000 in 2015/16 – an 
increase of 32%  (DCLG Live Tables, accessed January 2017). The most usual reason given is 
eviction from a private tenancy at the end of the lease. xxv 
Positives:  The UK’s welfare reforms were framed with some explicit fiscal tradeoffs which 
have also led to a modest number of positive impacts. One area where the welfare cuts seem 
to have had some positive effects is the numbers getting into work in order to avoid the 
welfare cap. This is reflected in the official figures which show that 83,700 have been affected 
since the introduction of the cap but some 40% are thought to have found work  and only 
20,000 are currently affected (DWP Live Tables, November 2016). A small interview survey 
undertaken by CCHPR found many of those interviewed valued the employment related 
mentoring that had led them into work (DWP 2014b).  
The further reductions in the cap introduced from 2016 will however begin to hurt 
mainstream family households in the rental sector with greater impacts on future incomes. In 
addition, innovative funding arrangements have maintained social sector investment though 
at the cost of higher rents and a larger Housing Benefit bill. These higher rents have for now 
been offset by discretionary payments and the government has ruled out reductions in tax 
credits and disability payments. Also, the physical investment in the existing social rental stock 
has been a positive for twenty years although funds for wider regeneration have become 
increasingly limited.  
A recent report by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (2016) also identifies some positive findings 
including that pensioner’s incomes have continued to grow and, after housing costs, they 
are now the least likely major demographic group to be in income poverty. They too noted 
that more people are in work than before. The proportion of children living in a household 
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where no-one works has fallen from nearly one in four in 1994–95 to less than one in six in 
2014–15. Only a third of children below the government’s absolute poverty line now live in 
a workless household – two thirds of those classified as poor are poor despite the fact that 
at least one of their parents is in work. In general, poorer families have become less reliant 
on benefits as employment has risen and middle- income households with children now get 
30% of their income from benefits and tax credits, up from 22% 20 years ago. Other 
research however points to particular groups who are suffering differentially (Barnard, 
2014; Bushe et al, 2014) 
Thus, welfare and housing policy changes in the UK have improved the conditions of older 
households (mainly because the ‘triple lock excludes them from welfare cutbacks) and have 
made a contribution to bringing more people into work. On the other hand they have 
reduced support for younger households and increased income insecurity, especially for 
those in the private rented sector.  Most importantly the use of CPI for upgrading benefits 
and now the four year freeze on such benefits reduce benefits to all working age households 
receiving support.  
Despite the modest good news, Tunstall’s (2016, p. 143) conclusion that the Conservative 
government’s additional budget cuts will most probably reduce “social and affordable 
housing development as well as (increase) tenant hardship and increase homelessness” 
appears to be correct. It also seems quite likely that because of the scale of the changes and 
deficit cuts that child poverty will increase (Browne & Hood 2016; Hills, Lupton, Burchardt, 
Stewart & Vizard, 2016). xxvi 
Discussion and Conclusions:   
In making this comparison between the USA and the UK it is important to start with stating 
the obvious: the US has far smaller programs of housing support than the UK where 
throughout the last fifty years housing has been a significant part of the welfare state. 
Equally the governance structures are very different with US seeing housing as a state and 
local issue to a far greater extent than the UK where local authorities act more as agents for 
the national government. Yet we observe considerable similarities particularly in how 
austerity programs have been implemented but also in the disproportionate emphasis on 
assisted housing cutbacks – even when the policy mechanisms chosen are different.   
Implementing austerity: The starting point and initial aspirations in both countries were 
extraordinarily similar – with massive deficits increased by stimulus packages (which in the 
UK included housing investment) and a similar time-line to balancing budgets.  Analogous 
constraints on what could be cut and what exempted were established based both on 
political pressures and longer-term policy objectives. The austerity decisions made in 2010 
through 2016 analogously created segmented forms of austerity in which only certain 
government agencies and programs were cut.  
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In both countries these budget cuts have proven to be malleable, subject to political trade-
offs; neither fixed nor immutable. A significant reason why the worst effects of austerity cuts 
have been lessened was not political decisions but rather a recovering economic base which 
created higher tax revenues and lowered debt costs; there were also lower interest charges 
on most global government debt. In some years tax revenues rose faster than expected. 
Later in 2015, the UK OBR pointed out that ‘growth across all the main taxes saw a £1.8 
billion increase in receipts in September”, compared to a year ago, contributing to £1.6 
billion less borrowing.  Borrowing is now £7.5 billion lower than a year earlier over the first 
half of 2015-16’ (OBR, 2015c). In the following year though receipts were lower than 
expected but expenditures were also lower – so borrowing was again lower than projected.  
Reductions in budget cuts also came about in the US because the BCA’s foundational statute 
inextricably linked cuts to domestic programs to those for the military and there was 
increased pressure to increase defense funding (Greenberg, 2013; Heo & Bohte, 2012). The 
second part of the reasons for the variability or mutability of budget cuts was analogous to 
those in the UK: revenues increased and mandatory debt payments declined.  
It would appear then logical and predictable that further housing cuts from discretionary 
budget accounts will inevitably reappear once revenues falter, debts rise, or pressures for 
increased, asymmetrical funding for the military rises. Indeed both governments have 
expressed some intention to continue with their budget retrenchment for years to come, 
despite reductions in deficits and despite the fact that it is the costs of entitlement programs 
which heavily influence deficit and debt levels and not funding for discretionary programs 
(Streeck, 2013; Congressional Budget Office, 2016d).  
Housing specific issues: The political systems in each country have then used the facts and 
logic of austerity - of intrusively high deficits and debt – to target housing related programs 
for reductions. Both countries experienced modest reductions in the levels of funding to 
social rental and public housing programs, with the prospect that there will likely be further 
attrition of funding over the next decade (Skocpol & Jacobs, 2010; Lubell, 2015; Collinson, 
Ellen & Ludwig, 2015; Stephens and Stephenson, 2016).  
Despite these political similarities in the logic and momentum of budget retrenchment, the 
two countries differ in crucial ways. In the US reductions have been achieved without any 
explicit electoral decision that the US should consciously reduce its support for housing for 
the poor. Rather the populist rhetoric of “starving the beast” of government has appeared 
as the principle rationale for budget cuts to anti-poverty and housing programs. The UK on 
the other hand made a long-term policy commitment to reshaping the welfare state 
including bringing considerably greater market pressures into the provision of social housing 
and integrating housing support more into the overall welfare system.  
Yet in crucial ways the UK is only following where the US led many years ago. In particular, 
the UK’s reductions in welfare support which includes explicit  incentives to work as well as 
18 
 
more positively through the minimum wage are seen as explicitly following what has been 
seen as a modestly successful US example (Ellwood, 2000; Danziger, Heflin, Corcoran, 
Oltmans & Wang, 2002; Moffitt, 2015).  
The close alignment of public views with the logic of austerity in the US suggests the 
paramountcy of the view that high deficits and debt levels must be cured, leaving little room 
for new, emergent, or critical needs of the poor (Congressional Budget Office 2016c). The 
chronically polarized state of US popular and political opinion suggest the complexity, and 
potential futility, of efforts to mobilize interest groups to reverse the budget cuts affecting 
affordable rental housing (Gilens, 1999; Garfinkel, Rainwater & Smeeding, 2010; Brooks and 
Manza, 2013; Pew Center 2012 & 2013). The threat or probability of further deficit 
reductions will also likely cause housing delivery agencies to hesitate or withdraw from new 
commitments and plans.  
Attitudes in the UK remain more generous and possibly more sustainable because of past 
investment decisions and because a unitary state can more easily enable nationwide policy 
formulations and impacts (NHF, 2007 and 2014; British Social Attitudes, 2013). Even so, the 
impact of freezing support for working age households and reducing the maximum support 
payable under both over all welfare and rents, which leave many households with incomes 
that are inadequate to pay for other necessities, appears to have generated very little public 
concern.  
We therefore reach two allied major conclusions. First, that while there are notable surface 
similarities – mostly in timing and exemptions - outcomes will remain dissimilar because of 
the different, divergent histories of support. There is potentially more to cut in the UK but 
so far the cuts have been limited. Importantly there have been opportunities based on 
earlier investment to shift from grant to debt finance enabling affordable housing 
investment programs to be continued as well as some greater freedom for local authorities 
to deliver additional housing.  For the US, there is a political probability that federal funding 
for housing assistance will be transferred into state administered block grants, with the 
additional probability of steadily reduced national support. 
The second central finding is that while each country modified initially planned reductions in 
funding for welfare and housing programs, modest negative impacts have already appeared 
for many housing agencies, and for lower income working age tenants in both the US and 
UK, with the prospect for larger on-going negative effects.  
A third issue that is implied from both the difficulties in implementing austerity in both 
countries and the extent upward trends in expenditures have continued to increase despite 
cutbacks is that underlying demographic and economic change will continue to put upward 
pressure on expenditures for decades to come. Austerity provided the opportunity for 
restricting eligibilities and limiting payments but the pressures for further restrictions are 
likely to continue unless economic growth and productivity can be consistently improved.    
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A necessary implication , as we conclude this analysis, is that for both the US and the UK it is 
hard to detect outcomes and impacts of changed funding and policies clearly; complex to 
separate out the impact of specific changes from fundamental economic pressures (Hills, 
Lupton, Burghardt, Stewart & Vizard, 2016, p. 337). Because little is known about the causes, 
momentum, comparative differences, and impacts of austerity choices we cannot with any 
confidence predict the trajectory or targeting of additional fiscal change. This uncertainty 
leads to a call for further research in both countries better to understand the persistence 
and full extent of harmful, or positive, impacts that will occur as a result of the drive 
towards substantial budgets cuts begun in 2010. Austerity-cased fiscal reductions need 
further comparative examination since the timing, logic, and consequences of cutting 
funding to affordable rental programs can be so profound. 
Because some degree of budget reduction for housing appears likely to continue in both 
countries as  high debt levels persist, further research on fiscal austerity’s impacts upon 
affordable housing appears an important on-going part of welfare policy analytics. Research 
is needed to clarify whether policy convergence towards reduced support for housing the 
poor, or continued uncertainty and volatility, will apply for the coming decade. We need a 
better understanding of the logic, momentum, tradeoffs and harms imposed by the 
decisions that have been made in both countries in the name of debt reduction and housing 
reform. 
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ENDNOTES: 
i There is limited evidence that international institutional pressures directly solidified austerity pressures 
(Schafer & Streeck 2013; Krugman 2015). We do not address the role of public opinion as we cannot, with 
current evidence, resolve questions about whether “the preferences of the average American appear to have 
only a miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon” policy choices (Gilens & Page 2014: 21).  
ii In the case of US housing programs, it is important to recall there are distinctions between reductions in the 
numbers of units of assistance and reductions in the rate of growth of numbers, i.e., incremental assistance – 
further complicated of course by the duration of budget authority which can entail many years of assistance 
provided in a single year’s appropriation whether new or renewal. It is also necessary to point out that while 
we focus upon the US federal deficit and debts, there are also state and city level debts that are not included 
in this analysis. See: CBO 2015b. 
iii Housing Benefit is an as of right subsidy towards rental payments in both the social and private rented 
sectors. Conditions vary between the two sectors being less generous in the market sector. Some two thirds of 
all social tenants and around 25% of private tenants are in receipt of Housing Benefit. 
iv  Counting Housing Benefit as part of income, on average tenants in social housing pay more than 30% of 
their income in rent and private tenants over 40% (English Housing Survey, 2013/14). 
v There is an allied lack of transparency of detailed budget negotiations with few means to assess the 
motivations and tradeoffs for the budget decisions enacted. Cutting deficits and debts may for example mask 
partisan opposition to the national government, as in the US, to aiding the poor, or to particular housing 
support programs (Williamson, Skocpol, &  Coggin, 2011; Mann & Ornstein, 2012).  
vi Note that the GDP for the UK, at roughly $2.8 to $2.9 trillion, is 15 to 17 % the size of US GDP at $17-$18 
trillion. The UK population is also roughly 20% the size of the US population. 
vii The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget in the US has campaigned for years to address the rising 
costs of entitlement program spending. http://crfb.org/ 
viii  IMF 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm. 
ix This position is almost certainly going to change as a result of modifications in Conservative policy post the 
Brexit referendum – both because austerity has been downgraded and because there is greater recognition of 
the need to help those who feel excluded.  
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x “The joint committee shall provide recommendations and legislative language that will significantly improve 
the short-term and long-term fiscal imbalances of the Federal government.” Title IV, section 101, part b3aI of 
the BCA of 2011 (Krugman 2013).  
xi This analysis does not attempt an in-depth examination of the ways in which the federal government 
calculates its baseline and alternative budget projections, nor does it directly address the issue of how much 
debt a society can or should manage. See Galston (2013a; 2013b) and CBO (2013a; b). The White House 
provides its own website portal on sequestration at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/sequester 
xii The BCA was amended three times to raise the fiscal caps:  the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act  of 2012 raised the caps for 2013; the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 raised the 
caps for 2014 and 2015; and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 raised the caps for 2016 
and 2017.  
xiii Following the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron in 2016, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Hammond, was quoted in the Financial Times (7/15/16; p. 3): "Of course we have to reduce the deficit 
further...but looking at how and when and at what pace we do that, and how we measure progress in doing 
that is something we now need to consider." 
xiv The BCA initially also exempted funding for food stamps (SNAP), Veterans programs, Pell grants for 
education, welfare or temporary assistance to needy families, and Medicaid. These programs offer assistance 
to the large, increasing numbers of households harmed by the Great Recession, with increased caseloads and 
larger expenditures (Moffitt, 2013: 145; Edin & Shaefer, 2015).  The most significant anti-cyclical programs 
exempted were Unemployment Insurance, the EITC, and food stamps.  Evidence suggests that this latter set of 
programs typically helps those marginally better off and do not offer comparable aid to the very poorest, most 
notably those out of the work force (Moffitt 2013: 161). The list of programs that have been exempted from 
the BCA cuts: ”Exempt Programs and Activities” US Code 905, Cornell University Law School: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/905 
xv The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget in the US has campaigned for years to address the rising 
costs of entitlement program spending. http://crfb.org/ 
xvi Also, initial BCA cuts from HUD’s major rental housing programs, public housing, amounted resulted in $199 
million in reductions in funding for both capital building repairs and for normal operating costs (Volsky, 2013; 
HR&A, 2013).  Two of HUD’s other major programs, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and 
HOME programs, were cut in half.xvi  xvixvi. Some forms of rental assistance and homeless aid, mostly for 
veterans, experienced modest increases. 
xvii https://projects.propublica.org/recovery/gov_entities/8600/list. Thus these programs experienced roughly 
$1 billion in funding reductions in just the first year of sequestration (GAO, 2014a, p. 73). 
xviii http://www.phada.org/pdf/HCV_Admin_Fees_Issue_Brief.pdf 
xix Reserves held by PHAs were also drawn down, declining in a sample of PHAs from $80,064 in 2010 to 
$55,556 by 2013 (Abt, 2015: 5). 
xx These reductions are not solely attributable to the BCA as there has been a longer term trend, since 2000, of 
cutting discretionary funding to this program (Shapiro, DeSilvla, Reich, & Kogan, 2016). 
xxi Estimates are from the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation:  Note that the JCT estimates report the 
cost of all the credits used in a particular year. Since LIHTCs are claimed over ten years, the 2015 number will 
reflect not just new 2015 credits claimed in that year, but also credits that were first allocated between 2006 
and 2014, but claimed in 2015.  https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857 
xxii See the minimum monthly rent of $150 for the Lexington Kentucky authority at: 
http://www.lexha.org/housing-choice-voucher/rent-reform-study 
xxiii The US Congress instructed the General Accountability Office (GAO,2014; 2015) to conduct small-scale 
assessments of the early impacts of sequestration, with the focus mainly upon how federal agencies 
themselves were impacted. Agencies transferred funds they controlled between accounts, including using 
unspent or unobligated funds (GAO, 2014). No further research has been planned by the GAO on the effects of 
the BCA. HUD is funding alternative, less costly methods for managing their assistance programs (GAO 2014a: 
76), using innovations to learn how innovative rent setting, new minimum income requirements, changed 
eligibility rules, or the encouragement of more business like methods may enlist the support of public housing 
agencies in managing with the reduced levels of support (Cadic & Nogie 2010; Jain, 2015; Schwartz, 2016).   
xxiv One potential measure of housing need in the US that should reflect the impact of budget austerity is the 
level of severe housing cost burden since such estimates of need partly reflect the fact that housing subsidies 
are not an entitlement. They also reflect the fact that measures of housing need are enumerated differently by 
two major data collection systems, the American Housing Survey and the American Community Survey.  The 
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Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard for example uses the latter data source which shows higher levels 
of need. While sampling and measurement issues may account for some of the increases, there is no means to 
know how much of the increase in need is due to reductions in federal housing support or to increases in 
market rents tied to limited supply. The trajectory of increased need however seems far more plausible than 
any flattening or reduction (Leopold 2012). On MTW see: 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/mtw 
xxv Interestingly in Wales and Scotland these figures actually declined, perhaps reflecting more generous 
policies but also less pressure on rents. 
xxvi Even so, recent Joseph Rowntree Foundation research on poverty suggests there have been no real 
increases to date in the costs of child poverty since 2008 (JRF, 2016).  
Table 1: Comparison of US and UK Deficit and Debt Levels, as % of GDP: 2000 – 
2021/26 (est.) 
US Deficits and Debts(in billions 2016 dollars) UK Deficits and Debts (in billions 
2014-15 £ sterling) 
Year Deficit % GDP Debts % GDP Deficit %GDP Debts %GDP  
2000;1    118.9       0.9   4693.3 33.6 -23.8 -1.6   440.3 29.9 
2009;10  1712.1 10.8   8335.3 52.3 170.9  10.3 1108.9 65.2 
2015;16    465.7 2.6 13117.0 73.6   72.0   3.8 1587.5 83.7 
2026;21   1009.6 3.7 23662.6 85.6 -10.1 - 0.5 1584.7 74.7 
Sources: US data are from CBO Annual budget reviews as of March 2016; constant 
2016 dollars; “Budget & Economic Outlook: 2016-2026” 
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data 
UK Office of Budget Responsibility data at: http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/data/ 
up to 2021.  
 
  
  
  
Chart 1: Characteristics of Budget Cuts Affecting Affordable Rental Housing in the US and 
UK: 2010-2016 
Characteristic US UK 
Prompted by Fiscal Crisis deficit 
& debts 
Yes Yes  
Electoral campaigns focused on 
deficits & debt 
No Yes: in both 2010 & 2015 
Intended duration  Long-term: until 2025 or debt 
levels decline 
Long-term: at least to 2019 –to 
be extended in modified form 
into 2020s  
Structure of cuts Segmented: discretionary 
funding targeted: exemptions 
for social security, health care, 
tax credits 
Segmented: exceptions for 
pensions, health care and 
education as well as overseas 
aid and later military 
expenditure  
Variations Variations in the initial 
legislative reductions of 2011 in 
2013-14 & 2015-16 
Variations through reductions in 
planned cuts in 2011;  
additional cuts put in place in 
2015 but some reversed in 2016 
Equal reductions to each 
discretionary program?  
Specific housing programs cut 
more heavily than average 
Reductions applied particularly 
to the capital program but also 
to future increases in person 
specific assistance 
Figure 1: BCA funding reductions for specific HUD programs: 2010-2015 
 
Source: OMB data from Douglas Rice, Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, October 2015 
  
  
 
Table 2: Initial Effects of 2011-2016 budget reductions upon US 
rental housing assistance  
1. Staff reductions 
2. Freeze on raises, bonuses, training, travel 
3. Freeze in issuing new vouchers/reduce voucher issuance 
4. PHAs stop administering rental vouchers 
5. Administrative streamlining based on HUD instructions 
6. Rising concern over staff turnover, program quality, fraud 
7. Inability to manage emergency housing repairs & long-
term capital repairs/ sustainability needs 
8. For select agencies, authority/pressure to establish or 
raise minimum rents  
9. Termination of funding for developing rental housing for 
elderly/disabled  
Sources; Abt 2015; exhibit 3-7; GAO 2016: 5; agency interviews; agency 
websites. 
 
 
 
  
Table 3:  Main policy Instruments to restrict spending England/UK 
 Years Capital Grants Reduced for 
affordable housing 
Housing Benefit (HB) Cuts 
income related benefits for 
private & social tenants) 
Baseline : 2008 - 2011 £8.4 bn: produced 155,000 units  
2012- 2015 Grants cut to £4.5bn to produce 
175,000 units  but implies higher 
borrowing & higher rents for new 
tenants 
Restrictions on maximum 
eligible rents; support for 
younger single people; 
Reduced size of social unit 
eligible for HB. 
Introduction of maximum 
welfare payments for working 
age households implemented 
through HB 
              2016 - 2020 Cut to £1.7bn to produce 165,000 
units – implies further borrowing & 
possible rent increases 
Further restrictions on eligibility 
for young people 
Rent cap and welfare cap 
frozen for 4 years 
 
Autumn Statement 2016 Added £1.4bn in funding for 40,000 
units 
 
 
